Internet Voting, Security, and Privacy by Epstein, Jeremy
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 19 | Issue 4 Article 4
Internet Voting, Security, and Privacy
Jeremy Epstein
Copyright c 2011 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Jeremy Epstein, Internet Voting, Security, and Privacy, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 885 (2011),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol19/iss4/4
INTERNET VOTING, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY
Jeremy Epstein*
Pajama voting may be convenient.  It just can’t ensure your vote
will count.
—Mitch Trachtenberg1
We don’t have the technology yet to do [Internet voting] in a secure
way, and we may not for a decade or more.
—Ron Rivest2
A government election is something that you don’t want to do over
the Internet.
—Ben Adida3
[T]he impetus to remove voting roadblocks is, we fear, causing some
states to rush recklessly toward Internet voting despite the limits of
today’s security technology.4
ABSTRACT
Internet voting is an appealing concept to most voters, primarily for reasons of
convenience (“why can’t I vote in my pajamas at a convenient time”), while appealing
because of the attractiveness of technology.  However, Internet voting is fundamentally
different from other types of online transactions such as banking or shopping.  In this
Article, I describe different types of Internet voting, the advantages and disadvantages
from a security and privacy perspective, and provide perspective on the history and
evolution of the field.
* SRI International. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Symposium: Privacy,
Democracy, and Elections, October 22, 2010. This article was prepared with support from
ACCURATE: A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable and Transparent Elections,
under National Science Foundation Grant No. 0524111.
1 E-mail from Mitch Trachtenberg, Software Developer, to author (Oct. 11, 2010, 11:06
EST) (on file with author).
2 Alex Altman, Will Online Voting Turn Into an Election Day Debacle?, TIME, Oct. 15,
2010, available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,2025696,00.html (quoting
Ron Rivest, computer scientist and cryptography expert).
3 Dan Morrell, Secret Ballots, Verifiable Votes, HARV. MAG., May–June 2010, at 10
(quoting Ben Adida, inventor of Helios, an Internet voting system).
4 Editorial, Hacked!, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2010, at A14.
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INTRODUCTION
Internet voting is so “obviously” good that the move in that direction frequently
happens without consideration of the security and privacy issues.  The presumption
is that increased convenience of voting will increase turnout, especially among
younger voters who are more comfortable with technology.5  Additionally, Internet
voting is claimed to offer opportunities for improved voter turnout for overseas and
military voters6 whose rights are protected under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen
Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA).7  Towards this end, the Military and Overseas Voter
Empowerment Act (MOVE) requires that localities make blank ballots available via
the Internet and requires forty-five days between when blank ballots become avail-
able and the deadline for receipt of marked ballots.8  Some localities have interpreted
these two requirements as requiring localities to offer return of marked ballots over
the Internet, although the law does not appear to have that requirement.9
In the November 2010 Congressional Election, thirty-three states allowed return
of marked ballots over the Internet.10  Lost in this wholesale move is informed con-
sideration of whether such returns are secure or private.  In this Article, I explore the
different types of Internet voting, and security and privacy issues associated with
different approaches.
Part I reviews the types of activities under the rubric of Internet voting, and the
types of voting systems that follow.  Part II reviews the advantages and disadvan-
tages of Internet voting, identifying which of the types of voting systems they apply
to.  Part III discusses some mitigating and aggravating factors.  Part IV covers some
differences between private and public elections.  Part V concludes the paper.
I. WHAT IS INTERNET VOTING?
The term “Internet voting” is used to cover a wide range of technologies.  For
purposes of this Article, I exclude such activities as voter registration, checking on
the status of submitted ballots, and obtaining information about races from official or
campaign websites.  Rather, I consider “Internet voting” to refer to actions that are
used by voters to obtain and potentially return marked ballots using the Internet.
5 See Renee Cross, Internet Voting: Casting Your Vote by Mouse, LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS OF TEX. EDUC. FUND 3 (2009), http://www.lwvtexas.org/VotingProcedures/Voting
%20Proc.%20F&I-%20Internet%20Voting%20final.pdf.
6 See Editorial, Hacked!, supra note 4; Thad E. Hall, UOCAVA: A State of Research
(CALTECH/MIT Voting Tech. Project, Working Paper No. 69, Sept. 15, 2008), http://www
.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/UOCAVA_Hall_Report.pdf.
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to 1973ff-6 (2006).
8 Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2321–22 (2009) (passed as part of the National
Defense Authorization Act for the 2010 Fiscal Year).
9 See id.
10 Altman, supra note 2.
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In this Part, I outline three major independent factors within Internet voting tech-
nologies:11 whether the system is used for blank ballots or ballot return, whether the
system is dedicated or non-dedicated for voting, and whether the system is supervised
by an election officer.  There are many other factors which affect the security of Internet
voting, including:
• The types of security analysis performed of the system, including soft-
ware and hardware, who performs the analysis, and whether the analysis
is public.
• Whether the system uses proprietary or open source software.
• The protections in the system against insider threat.12
• The managers of the servers used for Internet voting.13
As these apply to all types of Internet voting, I do not further divide the universe
based on these questions, although the risk from each will differ depending on the three
major factors.
The term “Internet voting” is used to refer both to the distribution of blank ballots
(printed) to voters via the Internet, through a website or via e-mail, and to the return
of marked ballots via the Internet, through a website, e-mail, or fax.14  For clarity,
11 Other factors are also possible. In a presentation entitled “Thoughts on UOCAVA
Voting,” before the Election Assistance Commission, the Federal Voting Assistance Program,
and the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s UOCAVA workshop on August 6,
2010, Professor Ronald Rivest identified six factors—(1) how the ballots are sent to the voter,
(2) whether ballots are paper, electronic, or both, (3) whether voters are supervised or un-
supervised, (4) whether ballots are marked by the voter (using a pen), a kiosk, or the voter’s
personal computer, (5) whether ballots are returned by mail, Internet, or both, and (6) whether
there is no auditing, moderate auditing, or comprehensive auditing. Ronald L. Rivest, Viterbi
Professor of Computer Sci., Thoughts on UOCAVA Voting, Presentation at the Workshop
on UOCAVA Remote Voting Systems 4 (Aug. 6, 2010), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/
UOCAVA/2010/Presentations/RIVEST_2010-08-05-uocava.pdf.
12 Insiders in a voting system can include the vendor of the hardware and/or software, the
election officials, poll-workers, maintenance technicians, and others. It is impossible to com-
pletely prevent insider attacks, but systems have different levels of resistance to such attacks.
See, e.g., DAVID JEFFERSON ET AL., A SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SECURE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION AND VOTING EXPERIMENT (SERVE) 13, 28–29 (2004), http://www.servesecurity
report.org/paper.pdf. The United States Department of Defense’s Federal Voting Assistance
Program assembled a team of experts, the Security Peer Review Group, to complete the report.
Id. at 4.
13 For example, are the servers managed by the local or state board of elections, by a
government entity’s information technology organization, or by a private vendor?
14 Although a fax is frequently thought of as being unrelated to the Internet, a large fraction
of faxes traverse the Internet by being sent directly from a computer and/or being received by
a computer in the form of an e-mail, using services such as eFax. See EFAX, http://www.efax
.com (last visited April 10, 2011). Neither the sender nor the receiver of a fax can tell if the
counterparty used the Internet to send or receive the fax. KENNETH R. MCCONNELL ET AL.,
FAX: FACSIMILE TECHNOLOGY AND SYSTEMS 173–82 (3d ed. 1999) (comparing standard fax
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this Article refers to the former as blank ballot distribution and to the latter as ballot
return.  In cases of blank ballot distribution, some other non-Internet mechanism must
be used for marked ballot return (e.g., the United States Postal Service or FedEx).
Orthogonally from the question of blank versus voted ballots, the type of system
used to cast the ballot is a key differentiator.  Specifically, the voter can use a dedi-
cated computer to receive a blank ballot (and perhaps also to return a marked ballot),
or the voter can use her personal computer (e.g., laptop, desktop, handheld) to receive
the blank ballot (and perhaps also to return a marked ballot).15  The former is referred
to as kiosk or dedicated voting, while the latter is referred to as vote from home or non-
dedicated.16  In between variations are also possible, such as using a general-purpose
computer in a library, which I group with other non-dedicated methods.
A third orthogonal variation is whether the system used by the voter is super-
vised by an election official who can check voter identification and provide technical
assistance (referred to as supervised) or if the system does not have an election official
(referred to as unsupervised).17  Supervised systems may rely on the election official
or computerized systems to validate the voter’s identity, or even a combination, while
unsupervised systems must rely on computerized systems to verify identity.18
Most combinations of the above three factors are not only possible, but all have
unique advantages (and disadvantages).  I roughly order these combinations from the
least risky to the most risky:
1. Blank Ballot Distribution, Dedicated System, Supervised: A trained elec-
tion official provides access to a dedicated system that allows a voter to
obtain a blank printed ballot.  This is conceptually similar to obtaining
a blank ballot by mail.  The job of the election official is primarily to en-
sure that the voter gets the correct blank ballot for her.  Depending on the
system architecture, the election official may also be responsible for pro-
tecting the dedicated system against tampering.  The election official may
technology to PC-fax technology). Therefore, all faxes should be assumed, unless otherwise
validated, to use the Internet.
15 A dedicated computer is one that is not used for other purposes, such as web surfing
or e-mail, and is controlled to prevent the introduction of unauthorized software. See Jeremy
Epstein, Internet Voting: Will We Cast Our Next Votes Online?, REVIEWS.COM (Dec. 21, 2009),
http://www.reviews.com/hottopic/hottopic_essay_10.cfm (discussing computers dedicated
to voting).
16 Id.
17 Andreu Riera et al., Internet Voting: Embracing Technology in Electoral Processes,
in ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT: DESIGN, APPLICATIONS AND MANAGEMENT 80 (Åke Grönlund
ed., 2002).
18 Riera, supra note 17, at 80. In states where voter identification is not required, the
election official may obtain an affidavit or other validation from the voter. See, e.g., Help
America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2006) (explaining that voters can cast provi-
sional ballots by signing affidavits); Voter Identification Requirements, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16602 (last visited April 10, 2011)
(providing links to voter identification requirements by state).
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also verify identity, but because only blank ballots are provided, this is
not critical, as final authorization is typically determined when the ballots
are received by the election office based on a “wet signature” (i.e., an ink
signature on paper, not an electronic signature).
2. Blank Ballot Distribution, Dedicated System, Unsupervised: A voter may
access a kiosk or other dedicated computer to print a blank ballot, but
without any assistance or verification from an election official.  Because
the system is unsupervised, it must be self-protecting against tampering,
and must be usable by a voter without training.  The lack of an election
official may mean that the voting system must verify identity, but because
only blank ballots are produced, this is not necessary in most cases.
3. Blank Ballot Distribution, Non-Dedicated System, Supervised: A trained
election official provides access to the system.  However, because it is
not dedicated, mechanisms must be in place to ensure that the ballots pro-
duced are correct, even under the assumption that the system has been
tampered with (e.g., by installing malicious software).
4. Blank Ballot Distribution, Non-Dedicated System, Unsupervised: The
voter must have some mechanism to ensure that the ballot she receives
is correct, even under the assumption that the system has been tampered
with.
5. Ballot Return, Dedicated System, Supervised: A trained election official
provides access to a dedicated kiosk system that the voter can use to ob-
tain, mark, and electronically return a marked ballot.  This could include
either direct marking (e.g., by filling out a portable document format
(PDF) form or a webpage), or indirect marking by printing a ballot and
then scanning and returning it via e-mail or a webpage.  The job of the
election official is to ensure that the voter gets the correct ballot, as well
as to protect against potential tampering.  The election official may also be
responsible for validating the voter’s identity; however, this can be done
by the voting system (e.g., using a password provided to the voter through
postal mail).
6. Ballot Return, Dedicated System, Unsupervised: A voter accesses a kiosk
to obtain, mark, and electronically return a marked ballot.  As with the
blank ballot analogue, the system must be self-protected against tam-
pering, and must be usable by a voter without training.  The lack of an
election official means that the voting system must verify identity with-
out benefit of access to physical forms of identification (e.g., a driver’s
license).19
19 A voting system could be set up to read driver’s licenses or passports. However, without
some other mechanism (e.g., automated facial recognition, a closed-circuit camera on the
voting machine viewable by an election official, or confirmation with a biometric such as a
live fingerprint), there is no proof that the identification provided matches the person using
the machine.
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7. Ballot Return, Non-Dedicated System, Supervised: A trained election
official provides access to the system.  However, because it is not dedi-
cated, mechanisms must be in place to ensure that the ballots produced
and the marking software are correct, even under the assumption that the
system has been tampered with (e.g., by installing malicious software).
8. Ballot Return, Non-Dedicated System, Unsupervised: The voter must have
some mechanism to ensure that the ballot she receives and the marking
software are correct, even under the assumption that the system has been
tampered with.
Any of the blank ballot methods (1, 2, 3, and 4) may provide a method for mark-
ing the ballot before printing (e.g., by selecting candidates on an image of the ballot),
but not for submitting the marked ballot.
Through the remainder of this Article, I will refer to the above methods either
by name or by number.
Each of the above methods can be implemented in many different ways.  As
examples, the following subsections summarize the architectures of several systems
used in Internet voting pilots.
A. District of Columbia Overseas Digital Vote by Mail (DVM)
The District of Columbia DVM system is a ballot return, non-dedicated, unsuper-
vised Internet voting system (method 8) intended for use by UOCAVA voters.20  It
was proposed for use in the November 2010 election, although due to problems iden-
tified during the open testing period in October 2010, use of the system for the 2010
election is being limited to blank ballot distribution, non-dedicated, unsupervised
(method 4).21
In the system as designed, a voter receives a voter identification number and per-
sonal identification number (equivalent to a username and password) through the postal
mail.22  She then uses a personal computer to enter her name and PIN.23  Assuming
the voter name and PIN are a correct match and have not already been used in this
election, she receives an affidavit asking her to affirm that she is the voter, after which
she downloads the correct blank ballot as a PDF.24  She then uses the PDF reader’s
capabilities to mark the ballot by checking boxes and/or by typing names for write-in
20 Mike DeBonis, Hacker Infiltration Ends D.C. Online Voting Trial, WASH. POST, Oct. 4,
2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/debonis/2010/10/hacker_infiltration_ends_dc_on.html.
21 Id.
22 PAUL STENBJORN, D.C. BD. OF ELECTIONS & ETHICS, D.C. OVERSEAS DIGITAL VOTE BY
MAIL SERVICE: AN OVERVIEW & DESIGN MEMO 2 (2010), available at http://www.dcboee.us
/dvm/DCdvBM-DesignRationale-v3.pdf.
23 Id. at 24. There is no fundamental reason why a handheld device (e.g., the telephone)
could not be used, but these were not included in the pilot program.
24 Id. at 8.
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candidates, and saves the ballot to her disk.25  She then uploads the marked ballot to
the DVM server, where it is encrypted.26  The DVM server also stores the voter’s affi-
davit information in unencrypted form.27  After the election is over, the affidavits and
encrypted ballots are copied to an offline server, where the affidavits are reviewed in-
dividually by election officials.28  For those that meet legal requirements, the ballot is
decrypted and printed, after which it is treated the same as an absentee ballot.29
Although the DVM system was scaled back prior to the November 2010 elec-
tion,30 references in the remainder of this paper to DVM are to the system as originally
designed (i.e., ballot return).
B. Operation BRAVO (Bring Remote Access to Voters Overseas)
The Operation BRAVO pilot program was used in the November 2008 general
election to allow military voters from Okaloosa County Florida to cast ballots from
certain military bases.31  It is a ballot return, dedicated, supervised Internet voting sys-
tem (method 5).  Voters use a system managed by election officials in three locations
(England, Germany, and Japan) to cast their votes using a laptop.32  The votes were
uploaded to a server managed by the county.33  In addition, a paper ballot was gener-
ated for each vote, and the paper ballots were subsequently transferred to the Okaloosa
County Government where they were counted by hand after election results were certi-
fied.  No report has been published on the results of comparing the paper ballots to the
electronic ballots, or any analysis whether there are any successful or unsuccessful
attacks on the BRAVO servers.
II. POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Internet voting has many perceived advantages and disadvantages, which are
described in this section.
A. Enfranchisement
One of the motivations of Internet voting is to increase voter participation. 
Whether that goal is accomplished is unclear:
25 Id. The PDF form includes facilities to prevent voters from overvoting, presuming that
the PDF processor the voter selects implements those facilities correctly and has not been
subverted. There is no validation of undervoting. Critically, the server does not validate either
undervoting or overvoting. Id. at 4.
26 Id. at 6, 12.
27 See id. at 6.
28 Id. at 13.
29 Id. at 14.
30 See DeBonis, supra note 20.
31 Pilot Projects, OPERATION BRAVO FOUND., http://www.operationbravo.org/pilot
_projects.html (last visited April 10, 2011) [hereinafter Operation BRAVO Pilot].
32 Id.
33 Id.
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• In the city of Swindon in the United Kingdom, in local elections that
allowed Internet voting, turnout was unchanged from comparable
elections.34
• In Honolulu, Hawaii in local advisory board elections in May 2009,
turnout dropped by over eighty percent when comparing the election to
the prior election in 2007 for the same positions.35
Measuring the actual impact is more difficult:
• If an election provides a new means of voting but does not remove any
of the old means, then presumably the number of people who vote will at
least not diminish because of that new means.  This is a strong argument,
but it is not quantitative: it says nothing about how much the turnout
will increase—it could be negligible, or hugely expensive on a cost-per-
vote basis.
• Specific underserved populations of potential voters vote in small num-
bers today, in part, because the traditional means of voting present too
high a barrier to them.36  UOCAVA voters and students away at school
are two obvious candidate populations.  But although the barriers at least
for UOCAVA voters have been studied,37 there is of course no empirical
study to measure the actual turnout improvement that Internet voting
might offer because they have never had it.
• Surveys show that voters say that they would be interested in voting over
the Internet due to convenience.38  However, the studies do not account
for whether those same voters are more likely to vote if Internet voting
is available.  Voters who simply switch from in-person or absentee voting
to Internet voting would not contribute to an actual increase in turnout. 
34 THE ELECTORAL COMM’N (UK), ELECTORAL PILOT SCHEME EVALUATION: SWINDON
BOROUGH COUNCIL (2007), available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/
assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0014/13217/Swindonstatutoryevaluationreport_27190
-20110__E__N__S__W__.pdf.
35 Chad Van der Veen, Aloha to the Future, GOV’T TECH., Oct. 2009, at 40–41, available
at http://digitalmag.govtech.com/GT/GT_Mag_Oct09.pdf. No analysis has noted whether there
was a comparable level of interest or closeness in races between the two elections.
36 See, e.g., Miriam Galston, Civic Renewal and the Regulation of Nonprofits, 13
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 309 (2004); Patrick J. Troy, No Place to Call Home: A
Current Perspective on the Troubling Disenfranchisement of College Voters, 22 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 591, 592 (2006).
37 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 6, at 1, 9–11.
38 Derek Dictson & Dan Ray, The Modern Democratic Revolution: An Objective Survey
of Internet-Based Elections, SECUREPOLL (2000), http://e-voto.di.fc.ul.pt/docs/The%20Modern
%20Democratic%20Revolution.pdf (last visited April 10, 2011).
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For example, the addition of early voting has not increased overall turn-
out, according to Florida studies.39
Private elections (e.g., shareholder elections and professional association elec-
tions) may give an indication of a somewhat more positive result.  The Association for
Computing Machinery reports that “the turnout for ACM’s elections increased from
11.5% to 14.03% and has remained fairly steady” and “the percentage of international
ballots also increased.”40
A primary goal for Internet voting is to increase participation of UOCAVA voters,
who have a significantly lower rate of returned ballots than voters in general, or even
compared to absentee voters.41  Military voters often have difficulty obtaining blank
ballots because they move from location to location more rapidly than postal mail can
reach them, combined with the unreliability of postal mail.42  Hence, Internet voting
provides the opportunity to increase UOCAVA voter participation, because Internet
service is more readily available than postal mail in many locations.
However, in the small number of Internet voting pilots in the United States, there
is no evidence that turnout has increased compared to traditional methods of casting
ballots.43  Hence, relying on the Internet as a solution to turnout problems should be
treated with some care.
B. Over/Undervote Detection
Voters unintentionally skipping contests on a ballot (undervotes) or voting for too
many candidates for a contest (overvotes) have been a historic problem.44  However,
not all undervoting is an error—drop-off issue for voting “down ballot” is a well
understood phenomenon.  Hence, preventing undervoting is not the goal, but rather
preventing unintentional undervoting.45
39 FLA. COMM. ON ETHICS & ELECTIONS, THE EFFECT OF EARLY VOTING ON VOTER
TURNOUT IN FLORIDA ELECTIONS: 2010 UPDATE, S. INTERIM REP. NO. 2011-110, at 1, 3
(2010), available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2011/Senate/reports/interim
_reports/pdf/2011-118ee.pdf.
40 E-mail from Ass’n for Computing Machinery to author (Oct. 15, 2010, 16:17 EST) (on
file with author).The ACM is the “the world’s largest educational and scientific computing
society.” Association for Computing Machinery Committee On Ethics Elections, ASS’N FOR
COMPUTING MACH., http://www.acm.org (last visited April 10, 2011).
41 Hall, supra note 6, at 13, 15.
42 Id. at 9–10, 26.
43 See, e.g., Van der Veen, supra note 35, at 40–41 (discussing the low participation in
Hawaii’s 2009 all-digital election).
44 Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945, 956,
965 (2009) (noting that on paper ballots, using a pen instead of a pencil can be considered an
“undervote” while filling in the bubble for a candidate as well as writing in his or her name is
an “overvote” and that these issues came up during the Bush vs. Gore election, as well as others).
45 Providing an explicit “no selection” option is a way to avoid undervotes, but is not
generally allowed by state election laws.
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Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems46 used in precincts usually
provide review screens to warn voters of these omissions or errors.47  Ballot return sys-
tems (methods 5, 6, 7, and 8) can provide undervote and overvote detection and pro-
vide warning either as part of software running in the voting device, or in the server
that receives the ballot, or both.48  Blank ballot systems (methods 1, 2, 3, and 4) may
provide undervote and overvote detection in the ballot printing system, if they provide
a method for marking the ballot before printing.49
These requirements for coordination among localities have not been resolved
in Internet election pilot programs so far, as each pilot program has been run by a
single locality.50
Operation BRAVO implemented undervote and overvote detection in its system. 
The District of Columbia DVM project implemented limited overvote prevention
through facilities in the PDF reader; but because voters using non-dedicated computers
were not required to use a particular PDF reader, this was implemented inconsistently.51 
The District of Columbia DVM does not implement undervote and overvote protec-
tion when the ballots are received by the server.  Rather, undervote and overvote pre-
vention happens when the ballots are actually counted, at which point the voter has no
opportunity to resolve any problems.52
C. Cost and Staffing
Local election officials have long faced the burden of hiring and training enough
election officials, and the high cost of running elections with very limited budgets. 
With the average age of an election official reported to be over seventy,53 and with
Election Day frequently requiring a sixteen hour workday (depending on locality) with
minimal pay, finding and training enough workers is difficult.  Thus, reducing the
staffing levels through automation is an attractive option to localities, as is reducing
the cost per voter of conducting the election.
However, the cost and staffing profile for running elections over the Internet is
dramatically different from a conventional election.  In any of the eight methods
described above, the bulk of the cost and effort is in developing, maintaining, and
46 DREs are usually, but not always, touchscreen systems. See Paul Herrnson, Paper Trails,
Cryptography and Other Approaches to Vote Verification, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 657,
657 (2008).
47 See id. at 659.
48 If, for example, the ballot is encrypted on the voting device before submission, then
checking on the server becomes impossible.
49 See supra Part I.
50 See supra Part I.A and I.B for discussions of pilot programs in D.C. and Florida.
51 STENBJORN, supra note 22, at 4.
52 Id. at 20.
53 Jim Drinkard, Panel Cites Poll Workers’ Age as Problem, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 2004,
12:13 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/2004-08-08-voting-workers
_x.htm (citing a U.S. Election Assistance Commission study).
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operating the software used for Internet voting.54  In addition, depending on the
method chosen, there may be additional costs:
• Supervised methods (1, 3, 5, and 7) require election officials to manage
the voting systems, much as traditional pollworkers.
• Dedicated methods (1, 2, 5, and 6) require voting equipment.
• Blank ballot distribution methods (1, 2, 3, and 4) require election officials
to receive the ballots and treat them as ordinary absentee ballots.
• Some types of ballot return methods (5, 6, 7, and 8) may require election
officials to adjudicate the ballots using an online system, thus requiring
more training than for the adjudication of paper ballots received through
the mail.  For example, if ballots are received from an unsupervised sys-
tem (methods 6 and 8), then an election official must validate the attes-
tation before processing the ballot.
Some of these costs may be prorated across localities.  For example, each locality
will not place its own dedicated computer system at each military base, nor will each
locality have its own election officials.  Rather, all localities will need to coordinate
to provide common ballot formats so a common system can operate correctly for all
voters, and shared election officials will provide supervision.
Additionally, the cost of acquiring software for Internet voting can differ based
on factors including:
• Whether the software was obtained off-the-shelf or was developed custom
for the state or locality.
• Whether off-the-shelf software is available, and if it is open source or
proprietary.
• How much customization is required to meet the localities’ needs?  (For
example, to meet any state-specific requirements).
• Has the software already been approved for use in the state and/or locality
as required by law, or does this need to be part of the acquisition process?
• Is additional hardware required to operate the voting system?
• How much hardware redundancy is needed to provide the desired level
of reliability?
• Is additional network bandwidth required to support Internet voting? 
(Most likely for small jurisdictions).
• Does the state or locality have existing infrastructure such as data centers
with professional staffing capable of installing and operating an online
transaction system?  (States probably do, because most can handle some
motor vehicle and business transactions, but most localities do not have
these capabilities).
54 Joshua F. Clowers, I E-Vote, U I-Vote, Why Can’t We All Just Vote?!: A Survey of the
Changing Face of the American Election, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 61, 79–80 (2006).
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Regardless of the acquisition cost of the software and hardware, costs for Internet
voting also include training staff to operate the system, constant monitoring of the
voting system for security and reliability issues, updating the software to resolve prob-
lems found in operation, testing, maintaining and upgrading hardware, etc.
In short, Internet voting has real costs, even though the level of staffing may be
reduced through fewer polling places or fewer staff at each polling place.  Internet
voting experiments to date have had very small numbers of voters, and so the cost
per voter has been very high.55  Table 1 gives approximate costs per voter for several
recent experiments.
Table 1.  Sample Costs for Internet Elections.
Election Date Total cost Voters $/voter
Voting Over the Internet 2000 $6.2M56 8457 $73,800
Swindon (UK) Municipal
Election
2007 £1.2M
(est.)58
7,64759 £157
Democrats Abroad Primary
(presidential primary)
2008 $40,00060 11,16261 $3.58
Operation BRAVO
(Okaloosa County, FL)
2008 $700,00062
(approx)
9363 $7,000
(approx)
District of Columbia Digital
Vote by Mail64
2010 $300,00065 900 eligible66
(approx)
$30067
(approx)
55 A noted in Table 1, cost per voter has reached as high as $73,800.
56 FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, DEP’T OF DEF., VOTING OVER THE INTERNET PILOT
PROJECT ASSESSMENT REPORT 1-6 (July 2009), http://www.fvap.gov/resources/media/voi.pdf.
57 Id. at ES-1.
58 THE ELECTORAL COMM’N (UK), supra note 34, at 6.
59 Id. at 28.
60 Posting of Stanley Grossman, Int’l Treasurer of Democrats Abroad, to Democrats Abroad
(March 10, 2008, 11:05 EST) (on file with author). The amount reflects the money paid to
Everyone Counts, the vendor. The costs borne by the organization have not been disclosed.
61 Global Presidential Primary Results Report, DEMOCRACTS ABROAD 2–8 (2008), available
at http://www.democratsabroad.org/sites/default/files/DA%20Global%20Primary%20Results
%20FINAL%20REVISED.pdf. The total number of voters was calculated by adding together
the number of Internet voters listed for each country on the chart.
62 E-mail from Pablo Sarrias, VP of Sales and Mktg. for Scytl, to Pat Hollarn, Supervisor
of Elections (Oct. 10, 2008) (on file with author and released to the public).
63 Id.
64 Due to problems with the system described earlier in this paper, the program was only
used for ballot distribution, not ballot return.
65 See DeBonis, supra note 20. This figure, provided by the District of Columbia Board
of Elections and Ethics (BoEE), does not appear to include in-house costs by the BoEE.
66 Id.
67 The figure assumes that every eligible voter used the system to vote.
2011] INTERNET VOTING, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY 897
Presumably, the cost per vote would decline in subsequent elections for each of
these examples, because the cost of developing software, training staff, and similar
tasks would be spread over a number of elections.  Additionally, because each of these
examples (except Democrats Abroad) was a pilot program, the number of voters was
deliberately limited.  Finally, as the number of localities participating increase, many
of the fixed costs of developing software and processes can be prorated across the par-
ticipating jurisdictions.  The wide range of costs indicates, however, that it is far from
clear that Internet voting provides cost savings.
Operation BRAVO required more staffing than a traditional precinct—with three
locations and a total of ninety-three votes cast, there was at least one staff member and
several volunteers on average for every thirty-one voters,68 as compared to ratios of
nearly 100:1 or more in a traditional location.69  District of Columbia DVM minimized
field staffing expenses by using non-dedicated, unsupervised systems (election officials
must adjudicate ballots after the election).70
As with costs, staffing levels would change depending on the overall structure.  For
example, an Operation BRAVO-like system that was able to handle ballots from all
of Florida (instead of one county) might have a field staffing profile more comparable
to a traditional precinct.
D. Coordination
Supervised systems (methods 1, 3, 5, and 7) require an election official to partici-
pate in some portion of the voting process.  As noted above, the number of localities
in the United States precludes each jurisdiction (or even each state) from setting up
its own voting sites for UOCAVA voters.71  Thus, consolidation of responsibility is
necessary.  If the tasks involved in voting supervision include determining voter eligi-
bility (even including eligibility for a provisional ballot), the election official must be
able to make decisions for each of the localities that can be serviced through the voting
system.  Because states have radically different laws (frequently including that an elec-
tion official be a resident of the state or even locality of the voter),72 there may be legal
impediments to such consolidation.
For dedicated voting systems, localities (or states) must agree on the requirements
for the voting equipment.
68 Operation BRAVO Pilot, supra note 31. Depending on state law, there may have been
more than one election official for each of the three locations.
69 See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 2008 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND
VOTING SURVEY 78–79 (2009), available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/documents/2008
election administration and voting survey EAVS report.pdf.
70 STENBJORN, supra note 22, at 2, 9.
71 See supra Part II.C.
72 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-115 (2006); ARK. STATE BD. OF ELECTION, RULES FOR
ELECTION OFFICIALS (POLL WORKERS) TRAINING § 201 (2009), available at http://www.state
.ar.us/sbec/pdfs/2010/Election_Officials__Poll_Workers__Training.pdf.
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Operation BRAVO avoided coordination problems because it was only for voters
in a single locality.73  Unsupervised systems such as District of Columbia DVM do
not require such coordination.  Finally, we note that almost every week of the year in-
cludes an election somewhere in the country, so coordination becomes a year-round
activity, not exclusively for bi-annual November federal elections.
E. Software Compatibility
Dedicated voting systems can be specified for hardware compatibility, while
non-dedicated voting system must be able to run correctly on a wide variety of voter
computer systems.  Both options require more development time than traditional paper
ballots, which do not require any voter technology.74
Although at first blush compatibility appears simple, given the predominance of
Microsoft Windows, in reality there are far more variations than that.  Not only are a
substantial minority of users using Apple Macintosh computers, and a small minority
using Linux and other operating systems, but there are also variations within ver-
sions of the operating system.75  Adding to the operating system variety is differences
in browsers: while Microsoft’s Internet Explorer is used by a majority of computer
users,76 other browsers, including Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Apple Safari, and
dozens of less known browsers, are also in common use.77  However, users of Internet
Explorer 6, for example, are missing capabilities present in more modern browsers78—
and there are millions of computers still using Internet Explorer 6,79 including many
in the military due to slow replacement cycles.
Furthermore, there are differences in related software used in voting software,
such as Java and PDF interpreters.  The combination of software makes testing diffi-
cult, especially because it is critical that every voter’s ballot has the correct layout.
Voting system methods requiring a “thick” client (i.e., one that requires installa-
tion of software on the voter’s computer) are unworkable, both because of the variety
of hardware and operating systems in use that would need to be supported, but also
73 Operation BRAVO was a pilot project limited to Okaloosa County, FL. See Operation
BRAVO Pilot, supra note 31.
74 See supra Part I (summarizing a variety of systems and their requirements).
75 See, e.g., Operating Systems Version, MSDN, http://www.msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/
library/ms724832(v=vs.85).aspx (last visited April 10, 2011) (listing different versions of
Microsoft Windows).
76 Popular Web Browsers, WEB DEVELOPERS NOTES, http://webdevelopersnotes.com/
articles/popular-web-browsers.php (last visited April 10, 2011).
77 Id.
78 Stephen Shankland, Microsoft Actively Urges IE 6 Users to Upgrade, CNET NEWS
(Nov. 30, 2009, 3:08 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30685_3-10406468-264.html.
79 Approximately twenty percent of all computers used Internet Explorer 6 as of February
2010. Stephen Shankland, Tide Turns Against IE 6 as Usage Drops, CNET NEWS (Feb. 1,
2010, 2:06 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30685_3-20000033-264.html.
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because many voters use computers where installing software is prohibited.  In par-
ticular, many systems used by military voters are “locked down” to prevent installa-
tion of software to protect against many forms of malware, so any solution must rely
entirely on software already present on the computer.80  Because the common baseline
is a browser and a PDF reader, anything beyond that risks disenfranchising voters.
Operation BRAVO used dedicated systems so compatibility was not a consid-
eration.81  District of Columbia DVM experienced significant issues with compati-
bility—some ballots submitted by Apple Safari users were left blank (even if the voter
had selected candidates) and no warning was provided.82
F. Privacy and Accuracy When Casting Ballots
Four ballot marking systems (methods 5, 6, 7, and 8) rely on the software to mark
the ballot before returning.  (Even blank ballot systems can use software for marking
before the ballot is printed.)  The voter must rely on the software to mark the ballot as
instructed.  Software bugs or malicious software in the voter’s computer could modify
the candidates selected before the ballot is returned, even if the voter examines the
ballot on the computer screen.83
Many users rely on their employers’ computers for personal activities such as
online banking and shopping.84  Employers can monitor the online activity of their
employees not only by monitoring logs, but also by using “key loggers,” which record
key strokes and other input.85  Recent court cases have indicated that employers may
monitor personal use of employer-owned computers,86 which could compromise voter
privacy if the computer is used for voting.
80 See, e.g., PC Lockdown Software, HORIZON DATASYS, http://www.horizondatasys.com/
250416.ihtml (last visited April 10, 2011) (advertising lockdown software).
81 The project set up three remote voting kiosks, each staffed by workers who set up the
kiosk equipment and administered the system. See Operation BRAVO Pilot, supra note 31.
82 See Jaikumar Vijayan, Security Concerns Prompt D.C. to Suspend Web-Based Overseas
Voting, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/print/
9189578/_security_concerns_prompt_D.C._to_suspend_web_based_overseas_voting.
83 The Zeus botnet uses this technique to enable financial fraud, hiding from the user of a
banking website transactions that siphoned money from the victim’s account. This is known
as a “man in the browser” attack, because the money (or votes) are manipulated by the voter’s
browser (or other voting software). See Atif Mushaq, Man in the Browser: Inside the Zeus
Trojan, THREATPOST (Feb. 19, 2010, 11:35 AM), http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/man
-browser-inside-zeus-trojan-021910.
84 J. Beam, How Do Employers Monitor Internet Usage at Work?, WISEGEEK, http://
www.wisegeek.com/how-do-employers-monitor-internet-usage-at-work?html (last visited
April 10, 2011).
85 For a report of the use of keyloggers to steal financial data see PC Tools Warns of
Emerging, Complex Variant of Keylogger Threat Targeting Banks, MARKETWIRE (Mar. 10,
2006, 9:00 AM), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/PC-tools-warns-of-emerging
-complex-variant-of-keylogger-threat-targeting-banks-682384.htm.
86 See, e.g., Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548,
559–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that courts have “routinely” found that employers may access 
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G. Privacy of Returned Ballots
Election officials have well-defined practices to ensure that absentee ballots re-
ceived via postal mail are properly adjudicated without allowing connections between
voters and ballots.87  Blank ballot systems (methods 1, 2, 3, and 4) are equivalent to
other absentee ballots, and hence the mechanisms should require minimal changes.
Ballot return systems (methods 5, 6, 7, and 8) are more complex.  Supervised
systems (methods 5 and 7) may not have any voter-specific information associated
with the electronic ballot, if the election supervisor prevents access to the voting
system except by authorized voters, although correlations may be possible through
records kept by local election supervisors.88  Unsupervised systems, whether dedi-
cated or not (methods 6 and 8), require that the voter sends some form of identifying
information along with her ballot, so that the vote can be adjudicated by the election
official upon receipt.  This requires careful design so the election official cannot make
the adjudication decision based on the voter’s ballot, nor can the election official
see the voter’s ballot associated with her identity even after the adjudication decision
is made.
H. Vulnerabilities
Every software system contains vulnerabilities, even when extensive searches are
made to identify and fix vulnerabilities.89  The opportunities for vulnerabilities, and the
risks from those vulnerabilities depend on the system architecture.90  Broadly speak-
ing, vulnerabilities in Internet voting systems can occur in three places: the client (the
computer used by the voter for casting the ballot), the network (which transmits the
blank and/or marked ballots), and the server (where the blank and/or marked ballots
are stored).91
private files on work computers and that employees do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy on employer-owned computers).
87 For example, some locations use double envelopes where the outer envelope contains
the voter affidavit. Once the affidavit is approved, the ballot in an inner envelope is separated
from the outer envelope, and all inner envelopes are mixed before any are opened. See, e.g.,
VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-710 (2006). Of course, such schemes are not perfect—for example, when
only a small number of ballots in a precinct or ballot style are cast, or when an election official
deliberately subverts the system by marking inner envelopes with identifying information.
88 For example, if the election supervisor keeps a record of who voted at what time or in
what order, as is required in some states, that could be correlated with the time of ballot
receipt to compromise voter privacy. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 101.23 (LexisNexis 2010).
89 See Microsoft, Trustworthy Computing: Software Vulnerability Management at Microsoft
4–5 (July 2010), http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/info.aspx?na=46&SrcFamilyId=
3C87D741-8427-456D-9BB3-2BDB2D0272E5&SrcDisplayLang=en&u=http%3a%2f
%2fdownload.microsoft.com%2fdownload%2fB%2fB%2f3%2fBB3DA45E-87FD-4398
-B85D-21ADF2473D6E%2fSoftware+Vulnerability+Management+at+Microsoft.pdf.
90 See id.
91 INTERNET POLICY INST., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON INTERNET VOTING:
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Classes of client vulnerabilities may include:
• Credential theft.92  For example, malware93 that forwards the voter’s
credentials (e.g., username and password) to someone who can cast the
ballot later.
• Modification of the blank ballot presented to the voter.94  For example,
malware in the client could reorder or eliminate candidates or contests
from the ballot or change timing marks95 on the ballot.
• Modification or disclosure of the voter’s ballot.96  For example, sending
a duplicate copy of the voter’s ballot to another web site where it could
be used for coercion without the voter’s knowledge.
• Redirection of the voter using phishing.  For example, an e-mail to a
voter appearing to be from a preferred candidate97 could give a link to a
fake site instead of the real voting site.98
Classes of network vulnerabilities may include:
• Domain redirection.99  This technique exploits the Domain Name System
(DNS) so requests for a particular web site are redirected to a fake site.100 
ISSUES AND RESEARCH AGENDA 13–16 (2001), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs
/voting/nsfe-voterprt.pdf.
92 See PHILIPPE BEAUCAMPS ET AL., ON THE USE OF INTERNET VOTING ON COMPROMISED
COMPUTERS 2 (2009), available at http://www.loria.fr/~beaucphi/articles/beaucamps-reynaud
-marion-filiol-internet_voting-iciw09.pdf (defining “malware” as any type of program with
unwanted characteristics, such as viruses or spyware).
93 I assume such malware can be readily installed through techniques such as “drive by
downloads” or having voters open attachments that install software. Surveys show that between
10% and 50% of home computers in the United States have one or more types of malware
present.
94 See INTERNET POLICY INST., supra note 91, at 13 (discussing the three main points of
attack).
95 Timing marks are indicators, usually along the side, that help scanners find the location
of the marked region (e.g., the bubble to be colored).
96 See BEAUCAMPS ET AL., supra note 92, at 3.
97 For example, a Democratic candidate sending a link to a fake site to Republican voters
or vice versa. This is the high-tech equivalent of fliers used in minority neighborhoods of the
form “due to high turnout, Republicans vote on Tuesday and Democrats on Wednesday,” thus
disenfranchising voters who are unfamiliar with election laws.
98 See U.S. PUB. POLICY COUNCIL OF THE ASSOC. FOR COMPUTING MACH., ISSUE BRIEF:
INTERNET VOTING AND UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTERS 5 (2010),
available at http://usacm.acm.org/usacm/PDF/IB_Internet_Voting_UOCAVA.pdf.
99 See INTERNET POLICY INST., supra note 91, at 17.
100 DNS is the equivalent of the “white pages” for a phone system. Giving false DNS ad-
dresses is like changing a listing in the phone book to the wrong phone number. See Definition
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This would be very effective in sending a voter to a fake web site for
casting their votes.
• Routing redirection.101  This technique exploits the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) so network packets directed to particular IP addresses
are redirected to a fake site.102
• Network reconfiguration.103  If network devices such as routers are mis-
configured (or have unchanged or weak passwords), voters can be re-
directed away from the web site.
Classes of server vulnerabilities may include:
• Server break-ins.104  This broad class of vulnerabilities refers to gaining
access through bugs in the operating system and/or applications.
Any of the above types of vulnerabilities have the opportunity to compromise
ballot privacy and ballot integrity.
Operation BRAVO, by using a dedicated system, reduced the risks of client-side
vulnerabilities, since the potential is present for ensuring that only authorized software
is present (ignoring potential malware inserted by insiders).  Additionally, by using a
Virtual Private Network (VPN) for transmitting data from the voting kiosks to the
central server, most network issues can be detected (since the VPN will fail), although
they cannot be prevented.105  The main risk for Operation BRAVO is server vulnera-
bilities.106  Although there was no open opportunity for identifying vulnerabilities, a
team examined the system and provided a positive report on its strengths.107
of Domain Name System (DNS), in A DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING (John Daintith & Edmund
Wright eds., 6th ed. 2008).
101 See Michael Kassner, BGP: Yet another Internet time bomb, TECHREPUBLIC (Sept. 14,
2008, 7:41 PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/networking/bgp-yet-another-internet
-time-bomb/663.
102 BGP instructs packets how to get to their destination. Giving false BGP information
is like changing the road signs so drivers get lost or go to the wrong address. See Definition of
Border Gateway Protocol, in A DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, supra note 100.
103 See SID STAMM ET AL., DRIVE-BY PHARMING 1, 4 (2006), available at http://www.cs
.indiana.edu/pub/techreports/TR641.pdf.
104 See INTERNET POLICY INST., supra note 91, at 13–14.
105 See Paul Ferguson & Jeff Huston, What is a VPN?—Part 1, INTERNET PROTOCOL J.
June 1998, at 1, available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues
/ipj_1-1/ipj_1-1.pdf.
106 See EKR, DC’s Internet Voting Pilot, EDUCATED GUESSWORK (July 1, 2010, 2:21 PM),
http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2010/07/dcs_internet_voting_pilot.html.
107 Pat Hollarn & Carol Paquette, Operation BRAVO Found., Presentation to the National
Association of Secretaries of State Voter Participation Committee, Innovative Approaches to
Military Voting: Okaloosa County, Florida Remote Voting Project Overview and Proposed
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The District of Columbia DVM, because it uses non-dedicated voting systems, is
at risk for all of the client and network vulnerabilities.  The District provided an open
testing period and open source for public review, which enabled identifying critical
server vulnerabilities, as well as critical network misconfigurations.108
I. Fraud/Coercion
Any form of unsupervised voting is subject to fraud and coercion.  This has
historically been true with absentee ballots, including in locations such as nursing
homes.109  There is no reason to believe that Internet voting will be any different—
once the voter receives her credentials, those credentials may be sold, or the voter may
be coerced to cast her vote in a particular fashion.  There are methods possible to allow
Internet voting while limiting coercion.  For example, in Estonia, voters can cast as
many votes as desired, where only the last vote (before the closing time of the elec-
tion) is counted.110  Thus, there is no incentive for anyone to buy votes, and coercion
is reduced.  However, such schemes have not been used in the United States, in part
because they require storing information about the voter identity with the votes so they
can be replaced, thus increasing the risk that voter privacy will be compromised.111
III. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
The risks of Internet voting can be aggravated or mitigated based on factors
including:
• How small or large is the locality?  Large localities will tend to have
contests that are higher value, and hence of more interest to an attacker
who might seek to influence the results.  Additionally, large localities are
more likely to have larger and more skilled information technology staffs
who are more familiar with the nuances of setting up Internet servers and
keeping them securely updated.
Next Step (Feb. 7, 2009), available at http://www.operationbravo.org/documents/NASS
%20VP%20Briefing.pdf.
108 Digital Vote by Mail, DC BD. OF ELECTIONS & ETHICS, http://www.dcboee.us/DVM/
(last visited April 10, 2011); Jeffery Smith, Update: District Suspends Digital Vote by Mail
Pilot, CIVSOURCE (Oct. 7, 2010), http://civsourceonline.com/2010/10/07/update-district
-suspends-digital-vote-by-mail-pilot.
109 Jessica A. Fay, Elderly Electors Go Postal: Ensuring Absentee Ballot Integrity for Older
Voters, 13 ELDER L.J. 453, 454 (2005) (noting that nursing home voting is subject to fraud).
110 Dan S. Wallach, Voting System Risk Assessment Via Computational Complexity Analysis,
17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 325, 342 (2008) (discussing the Estonian voting system).
111 See id. at 343 (discussing the information stored in computers for the Estonian voting
system).
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• Who manages the election?  Even with traditional elections, many local-
ities rely on private sector providers to set up ballots, program voting
machines, diagnose problems, etc.112  When moving to Internet elections,
will the private sector provider set up servers to be used by voters, or will
it be done by the local election officials?  If by the private sector, what
security and privacy policies are enforced by the provider?
• Who provides the software?  Is the software used for the Internet election
provided by the locality, state government, or private sector?  If the soft-
ware is provided by the private sector, what rights does the government
have to access the source code and other information?  Does the vendor
use open source or proprietary software?  Although there is no inherent
advantage to either open or closed source, open source can provide greater
voter confidence.113
• What level of analysis and accreditation?  Has the software, regardless of
provenance, been subject to analysis by experts in accessibility, usability,
privacy, and security?  What processes are used for accreditation before
putting the software into use?
• Where does the software run?  For cost reasons, many services are being
shifted into “the cloud.”114  Running election software in the cloud
increases the risk from insiders, as the software may be running on com-
puters in foreign countries, as well as on servers not controlled by either
the localities or their vendors (who rely on third-party cloud providers).115
• How are voters provided credentials to access their ballots?  As many
voters only cast ballots every two or four years, expecting voters to re-
member a password is unreasonable, and even expecting them to have
the same e-mail address as they used at the last election is unrealistic. 
Relying on data like Social Security Numbers (SSN) does not work, since
many people have access to SSNs,116 and could cast votes on behalf of the
voter.  The best solution is to mail out credentials (via the postal service)
in advance of the election.
112 See Harry Neufeld, Computerizing Electoral Administration, reprinted in 7 ELECTIONS
TODAY (Special Issue) 31, 35 (1998).
113 James W. Paulson et al., An Empirical Study of Open Source Software Products, 30
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 246 (2004), available at http://ieeexplore
.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1274044&userType=inst (discussing the advantage
of open-source software products).
114 See Francoise Gilbert, Cloud Service Contracts May be Fluffy: Selected Legal Issues
to Consider Before Taking Off, 14 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2008) (stating the cost effectiveness of
using cloud computing systems).
115 David Binning, Top Five Cloud Computing Security Issues, COMPUTERWEEKLY
(Apr. 24, 2009, 2:46 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/articles/2010/01/12/235782/top
-five-cloud-computing-security-issues.htm.
116 Fact Sheet 10: My Social Security Number—How Secure Is It?, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs10-ssn.htm (last visited April 10, 2011).
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IV. PRIVATE ELECTIONS
A private election is an election held by a private organization, such as an associ-
ation or corporation to elect members of a board or decide questions.117  There are fun-
damental differences between private and public (government) elections,118 including:
• There may be no right to a secret ballot, or it may be by practice rather
than a legal requirement.
• The notion of one person, one vote may not apply.  For example, in
shareholder elections, votes may be based on the number of shares held,
and different classes of shareholders have different votes per share.
• There is no tradition of in-person voting, as there is for public elections. 
Hence, the cost and staffing comparison should be of mail-in ballots vs.
online ballot submission.
• Elections are only open to members (for associations) or stockholders
(for corporations), not the general public.
• There is no requirement for certification of the systems used for elections.
In some states, primary elections are private elections run by the State, where the
traditional guarantees of ballot secrecy do not apply.119  However, this Part is focused
on non-governmental elections.
The most critical difference between public and private elections, however, is the
difference in threat models.
• In corporate elections, it is extremely rare for a board member endorsed
by management to lose an election, or for a position opposed by manage-
ment to win.120  Similarly, most volunteer organizations (e.g., professional
groups) have relatively uncontested elections, so the results are frequently
preordained.121  Hence, determining “abnormal” results is easy, compared
to public elections where the “correct” result may be hard to identify.
117 See Carol A. Jones, Time and Method—Election of Directors by Shareholders, in
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 288 (William Meade
Fletcher ed., 2006) (discussing corporate elections).
118 Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board
Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FINANCE 1829, 1829 (1999) (stating differences
between private and public elections); Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. to Propose Change in Election
of Boards, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2009, at B3.
119 See J. A. Connelly, Annotation, Validity and Effect of Statutes Exacting Filing Fees
from Candidates for Public Office, 89 A.L.R.2d FED. 864, 866 (1963) (stating that primary
elections can be deemed private affairs).
120 Shivdasani & Yermack, supra note 118, at 1829.
121 See BOARDSOURCE, THE NONPROFIT BOARD ANSWER BOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
BOARD MEMBERS AND CHIEF EXECUTIVES 83–84 (Robert C. Andringa ed., 2d ed. 2007)
(stating that the preferred way to elect directors for a nonprofit organization is to submit an
uncontested list for a vote).
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• The value to an adversary in manipulating a private election is generally
much lower than manipulating a public election, especially when consid-
ering that truly anomalous results can be detected.122  The publicity value
to an attacker of subverting a private election is low, and in many cases
(especially for non-profit groups) candidates are only too happy to lose!
• In private elections, voters already have known identifiers (e.g., account
or member numbers) that can be used more accurately than quasi-public
identifiers like Social Security Numbers.123
Hence, the use of Internet voting for private elections may be appropriate, despite
the risks associated with public elections.  Certain private elections, such as union elec-
tions, are closer to public elections, and are probably not suitable for Internet voting.124
V. CONCLUSION
Internet voting is widely claimed to improve voter turnout and reduce costs. 
However, there is no justification for either claim.  Additionally, there are significant
risks to voter disenfranchisement.  Localities considering moving to Internet voting
need to consider the technical factors, focusing on key parameters such as blank ballot
distribution vs. ballot return, dedicated vs. non-dedicated systems, and supervised
vs. unsupervised systems.  Blank ballot distribution may be feasible, especially with
dedicated systems, but other types of Internet voting are too risky to be used for
public elections.
122 Labaton, supra note 118, at B3.
123 AMY L. GOODMAN ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES
§ 15.04 (West ed. 2009) (stating that shareholders are sometimes identified by personal iden-
tification numbers known as “PINs”).
124 See Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of
Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689, 712–14 (discussing
some similarities between private union elections and public elections).
